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NOTES AND COMMENTS
TAXING OF ELECTRICAL ENERGY: AN
ANALYSIS OF
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY v. SNEAD

The Electrical Energy Tax Act' was enacted in 1975 by the State
of New Mexico to provide revenue for highway construction2 and to
assist low-income New Mexico residents in the payment of their
utility bills.3 The Act placed a tax on all electrical energy generated
in New Mexico. The tax imposed on electricity sold in New Mexico
was credited fully against any amount owed under the state's gross
receipts tax. 4 The tax paid on electricity sold out-of-state was not
eligible for this credit because the out-of-state sales were not subject
to New Mexico's gross receipts tax.' In effect, the tax burden on
in-state sales remained at the level existing before the enactment of
the New Mexico Electrical Energy Tax Act while out-of-state sales
incurred a new tax burden.
In Arizona Public Service Company v. O'Cheskey,6 the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the Electrical Energy Tax Act (hereinafter the Act) was constitutional.' The Act had been challenged on
the bases of a potential conflict between it and a federal statute and
the potential discriminatory burden that the Act placed upon interstate electricity. 8 Since the New Mexico Supreme Court found that
1. N.M. Stat. Ann. § §7-18-1 to 6, 7-9-80 (1978).
2. Albuquerque Tribune, March 21, 1975, at C-11.
3. Utility Supplement Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 27-6-1 to 10 (1978).
4. A. If on electricity generated outside this state and consumed in this state, an
electrical energy tax or similar tax on such generation has been levied by
another state or political subdivisions thereof, the amount of such tax paid
may be credited against the gross receipts tax due this state.
B. On electricity generated inside this state and consumed in this state which
was subject to the electrical energy tax, the amount of such tax paid may be
credited against the gross receipts tax due this state.
C. The credit under Subsections A or B of this section shall be assigned to the
person selling the electricity for consumption in New Mexico on which New
Mexico gross receipts tax is due, and the assignee shall reimburse the assignor
for the credit.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-80 (1978).
5. N.M. Stat. Ann. §7-9-1 to 81 (1978).
6. 91 N.M. 485, 576 P.2d 291 (1978). Plaintiffs appealed the New Mexico Supreme
Court decision to the United States Supreme Court. A substitution of parties was made after
Arthur Snead succeeded to the functions of the previous defendant, Mr. O'Chesky. The
Supreme Court opinion in this case, rendered in April, 1979, reversed the New Mexico
Supreme Court decision and is reported at 99 S. Ct. 1629 (1979).
7. Id. at 490, 576 P.2d at 296.
8. Id. at 488, 576 P.2d at 294.
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the energy tax did not impose a greater tax burden on interstate
commerce, 9 the court concluded that the tax did not conflict with
Section 2121(a) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,' 0 which prohibits
state discriminatory taxes on the generation and transmission of electricity. 1 1 The court also concluded that the Electrical Energy Tax
did not violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. 1 2

The United States Supreme Court in Arizona Public Service Company v. Snead" a reversed the New Mexico Supreme Court and held
that the Electrical Energy Tax did violate the federal statute and was,
therefore, invalid under the Supremacy Clause. 1 This note will
examine the relationship between the state statute and the federal
statute in light of the preemption doctrine and the Commerce
Clause.
THE TWO COURT DECISIONS

The Arizona Public Service Company and four other large utility
companies' I were subject to the Electrical Energy Tax because of
their generation of electricity in the Four Corners area of New Mexico. 6 They sued the Commissioner of the Bureau of Revenue 7 and
the State of New Mexico. I I The plaintiffs sued in a New Mexico
district court and sought a declaratory judgment on the grounds that
the energy tax was void and unconstitutional because it violated the
Commerce Clause.' 9 After the original complaint was filed, Congress
9.

Thus, while the out-of-state electricity must bear an additionaltax that it was
not previously required to bear, payment of this tax does not result in a
"greater tax burden" on that electricity.

Id.

10. Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 2121(a), 15 U.S.C. §391 (1976).
11. S. Rep. No. 94-938, Part I, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 437-38, reprinted in [19761 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 3439, 3865-66.
12. 91 N.M. 485, 489-90, 576 P.2d 291, 295-96 (1978).
13. 99 S.Ct. 1629 (1979).
14. Id. at 1634.
15. El Paso Electric Company, Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power
District, Southern California Edison Company and Tucson Gas & Electric Company were
the four other plaintiffs.
16. 91 N.M. 485, 487, 576 P.2d 291, 293 (1978).
17. The Bureau of Revenue is now called the Revenue Division of the Taxation and
Revenue Department, after the passage of the N.M. Executive Reorganization Laws, 1977
N.M. Laws, ch. 249.
18. Record, vol. 1, at 1, Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. O'Chesky, 91 N.M. 485, 576 P.2d 291
(1978).
19. U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 3. Plaintiffs also alleged that the tax violated the ImportExport Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl.
2; U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; and U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
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enacted Section 2121(a) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.20 Plaintiffs amended their complaint to include an allegation that the energy tax conflicted with that statute and the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution. 2 1 After the state district court granted defendants'
motion for summary judgment,2 2 the plaintiffs appealed to the New
Mexico Supreme Court.2 3
The New Mexico Supreme Court upheld the Act against both the
preemption claim and the Commerce Clause claim. Section 2121(a)
provides:
No State ... may impose or assess a tax on or with respect to the

generation or transmission of electricity which discriminates against
out-of-State manufacturers, producers, wholesalers, retailers, or consumers of that electricity. For purposes of this section a tax is discriminatory if it results, either directly or indirectly, in a greater tax
burden on electricity which is generated and transmitted in interstate commerce than on electricity which is generated and transmitted in intrastate commerce. 2 4
In deciding whether the federal statute prohibited the energy tax, the
court examined both the direct and indirect burden placed on interstate commerce by the tax. 2 5 The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that the tax did not directly place a greater tax burden on
interstate electricity than on intrastate electricity since the energy
tax was imposed on all electricity generated in New Mexico. 2 6 In

order to determine if the energy tax indirectly imposed a greater tax
burden on interstate electricity, the state court examined the entire
tax structure of New Mexico. 2 7 The energy tax, four-tenths of one
mill ($.0004), was levied on each net kilowatt hour of electricity
generated in New Mexico. 2 8 This resulted in approximately a two
2
percent tax being imposed on the amount of electricity generated. 9
The two percent tax was credited fully against the state's gross receipts tax of four percent 0 which was imposed on the sale of intrastate electricity. The effect of the credit was to nullify the impact of
20. Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 2 121(a), 15 U.S.C. §391 (1976).
21. Record, vol. 4, at 710 to 720; Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. O'Chesky, 91 N.M. 485, 488,
576 P.2d 291, 294 (1978).
22. Record, vol. 5, at 993 to 994.
23. Id. at 995.
24. Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 2 121(a), 15 U.S.C. §391 (1976).
25. 91 N.M. 485, 488, 576 P.2d 291, 294 (1978).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-18-3 (1978).
29. 91 N.M. 485, 487, 576 P.2d 291, 293 (1978).
30. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-80 (B) (1978).
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the energy tax on electricity which was sold intrastate. The intrastate
electricity, however, was still burdened by an overall four percent
tax, of which two percent was energy tax and two percent was gross
receipts tax, while the electricity sold in other states was burdened
with a new two percent tax. 3 1 The court concluded that the tax did
not indirectly place a greater tax burden on interstate electricity
since electricity sold within the state bore the greater tax rate and,
thus, the greater tax burden. 3 2 Since the Electrical Energy Tax imposed neither a direct nor indirect burden on interstate electricity,
the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that there was no conflict
between the state statute and the federal statute.
The New Mexico Supreme Court also held that the Electrical Energy Tax Act was not violative of the Commerce Clause. 3 This
holding resulted from the court finding that the state energy tax did
not place out-of-state businesses at a competitive disadvantage with
local businesses.3 4 The court also relied on the finding that the
energy tax did not impose a multiple tax burden on the electricity
sold outside the state because the generation of electricity, which
was the activity taxed in this case, was strictly a local activity.3 ' The
generation of electricity would only be taxed once. 6
Plaintiffs appealed the New Mexico Supreme Court decision to the
United States Supreme Court on substantially the same grounds as
their appeal to the New Mexico Supreme Court.3 " The United States
Supreme Court found that the New Mexico Electrical Energy Tax
Act did indirectly burden interstate electricity and was violative of
the federal statute.3 8 Having made that finding, the Court did not
need to reach the constitutional issues and, therefore, did not consider whether the energy tax violated the Commerce Clause. 9
The United States Supreme Court determined that the federal
statute's prohibition of discriminatory state taxes on the generation
of electricity was applicable to the Electrical Energy Tax. The Court,
reasoning that the federal statutory language required an examination of the tax in isolation, 4 considered only the Electrical Energy
Tax. By examining the energy tax only, the Supreme Court con31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

91 N.M. 485, 488, 576 P.2d 291, 295-96 (1978).
Id.
91 N.M. 485, 489-90, 576 P.2d 291, 295-96 (1978).
Id. at 489, 576 P.2d at 295.
Id at 490, 576 P.2d at 296.
Id.
Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 99 S. Ct. 1629, 1632 (1979).
Id. at 1634.
Id at 1632.
Id. at 1634.
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cluded that, "[b] ecause the electrical energy tax by itself indirectly
but necessarily discriminates against electricity sold outside New
4 1
Mexico, it violates the federal statute."
THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE CLAIM
The utility companies claimed that the Electrical Energy Tax Act
was in violation of the preemption doctrine. Rooted in federal
supremacy notions,4 2 the preemption doctrine provides that when a
state statute and a federal statute conflict, either directly 4 3 or potentially, 4 4 the state statute must fall. 4 ' The purpose of the preemption doctrine is to prevent the states from frustrating the purposes
and objectives of the federal government in areas requiring national
uniformity 4 6 and in areas of enumerated federal concern. 4 7 A conflict is present when there is a contradiction in the two statutes4 8 or
when there is an expressed or implied congressional intent that the
federal statute be exclusive. 4 9
41. Id.
42. The Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Section 2 of the Constitution, is the source of the
preemption doctrine. The clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof ... shall be the Supreme Law of the Land ... and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
43. 2. That the question of supremacy cannot arise, except in the case of actual
and practical collision. 3. That such collision must be direct and positive, and
the state law must operate to limit, restrict or defeat the effect of a statute of
Congress.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 40-42 (1824); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
66-67 (1941).
44. And where the federal government,... has enacted a complete scheme of
regulation, ... states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress,
conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce
additional or auxiliary regulations.
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941).
45. "[T]o guard against a conflict in practice, the law of congress is made supreme."
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 41 (1824). Of course, both governmental bodies
must be acting within the legitimate scope of their powers when enacting the statutes in
order to necessitate an inquiry into conflict. Congress has the power to regulate interstate
commerce and may protect interstate commerce from any direct restrictions or impositions
placed on commerce by the states. The United States Senate Finance Committee, in passing
the bill which created Section 2121(a), expressed its belief that it clearly had the power by
reason of the Commerce Clause to enact the federal statute. The State of New Mexico had
the power to enact a tax on electricity generated within its borders to raise revenues for
legitimate state purposes.
46. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 144 (1963).
47. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971).
48. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,42 (1824).
49. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 771-72
(1947).
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To determine if a conflict will result from the enforcement of two
statutes, an inquiry must be made as to whether the state law can
coexist compatibly with the general purpose of the federal law.5 0
Even if the state law could coexist with the federal law, the state law
may still be invalid if Congress has intended either expressly or by
implication that a federal statute occupy the field. 5' The question of
congressional intent is resolved in the same manner as are all other
questions of legislative intent: if the plain meaning of the statute is
indiscernible, the legislative history of the statute is examined to
determine whether Congress intended its power over the subject to
be exclusive.' 2
To determine if a conflict existed between the New Mexico Electrical Energy Tax Act and Section 2121 (a) of the Tax Reform Act of
1976, the New Mexico Supreme Court examined the tax in terms of
its direct and indirect burden on interstate electricity.' s The court
found no greater direct or indirect burden on electricity sold out-ofstate as compared to that sold in-state.5 ' The court supported its
finding that no greater indirect burden was placed on interstate electricity by reasoning that a state can shift its tax burden from sole
reliance on a gross receipts tax to reliance on both the gross receipts
tax and an energy tax. To arrive at its finding that the federal statute
did not prohibit New Mexico's energy tax,' 5 the court examined the
effect of the entire tax structure of the state on the generation of
electricity rather than examining the Electrical Energy Tax in isolation.
The United States Supreme Court applied the prohibition found in
Section 2121(a) to the New Mexico Electrical Energy Tax and deter5
mined that the state statute did collide with the federal statute. 6
The Court concluded that the language of Section 2121 (a) required a
consideration of the specific tax's effect on the activity taxed. 5 7
Consideration of the effect of the entire tax structure of the state on
the activity was dismissed by the Court as being contrary to the
federal statute. By examining the tax in isolation, the Supreme Court
determined that the tax was discriminatory within the meaning of
Section 2121 (a).5 8 The tax credit provision of the Electrical Energy
50. Note, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 208, 209-10 (1959).
51. Local 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 259-60
(1964).
52. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146-52 (1963).
53. 91 N.M. 485, 488, 576 P.2d 291, 294 (1978).
54. Id.
55. Id
56. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 99 S. Ct. 1629, 1634 (1979).
57. Id.
58. Id.
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Tax placed no tax burden on locally consumed electricity while electricity sold out-of-state bore the entire burden of the two percent
energy tax. s 9 The Supreme Court buttressed this conclusion by
noting that the legislative intent of Congress in enacting Section
2121 (a) was clearly to invalidate the New Mexico Electrical Energy
60
Tax Act.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Arizona Public
Service Co. v. Snead rests upon its determination that Section
2121 (a) had independent vitality and was not a mere codification of
the Commerce Clause. Because of this determination, the Court
examined the energy tax in isolation. When considered in isolation,
the energy tax seems, although assessed against all generation of
electricity, to have been borne only by the electricity sold outside
the state. The electricity sold in New Mexico received a full credit for
the energy tax paid, which negated the energy tax liability. The tax
indirectly resulted in a greater tax burden falling on electricity generated and then transmitted in interstate commerce. The tax was thus
within the prohibition of Section 2121(a) and continued validity of
the state tax would frustrate the federal purpose.
If the Court had determined that Section 2121(a) codified the
Commerce Clause, then the Court would have examined the entire
tax structure of the state. The Court states in Arizona Public Service
Co. v. Snead that the constitutional test of the Commerce Clause
requires an examination of the entire tax structure and the Court has
applied this test frequently in the past.6 1 If the entire tax structure
of New Mexico had been considered in determining the applicability
of Section 2121(a) to the energy tax, the state energy tax may well
have fallen outside the prohibition of discriminatory electricity taxes
under Section 2121(a). The credit provision simply reduced the
amount of gross receipts tax owed to the state. When considered in
light of both the energy tax and the gross receipts tax, the in-state
sale of electricity had a greater tax burden than the interstate sale. 6 2
Under that analysis the prohibition found in Section 2121 (a) would
not be applicable because interstate electricity would not bear a
greater tax burden, either directly or indirectly, than would intra59. Id.
60. Id. at 1632-34.
61. In Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily, the United States Supreme Court stated that in
order to properly analyze the state use tax in question, "the whole scheme of taxation
[must be taken] into account." Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily involved a Commerce
Clause challenge only and did not involve any preemption doctrine issue. See also Gregg
Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472, 479-80 (1932).
62. The electricity sold in-state had an overall tax burden of four percent. This four
percent included a two percent energy tax assessed and a two percent gross receipts tax
assessed.
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state electricity. The state law, because it would have been compatible with the federal law, would have been valid if the entire tax
6
structure of New Mexico had been examined.
Even if no collision exists between a state statute and a federal
statute, a state statute may still be invalid if Congress intended a
federal statute to preempt the field. An intent to exclude a state
from legislating in a given area may be expressed in the language of
the federal statute itself 64 or it may be found in the statute's legislaThe congressional intent of federal exclusivity may
tive history.6
also be inferred if the state law frustrates an objective of the federal
law. 6 6
The language in Section 2121 (a) prohibits any state from imposing
6
a discriminatory tax upon the generation of electricity. 7 If the New
Mexico energy tax were construed to be a discriminatory tax on its
face, then Congress expressly intended to prohibit New Mexico's
imposition of the tax. If the energy tax were not clearly discriminatory, an implied congressional intent to exclude this type of tax may
be found in the legislative history of Section 2121 (a). It is this implied congressional intent that Section 2121(a) be exclusive that
caused the New Mexico Electrical Energy Tax Act to be invalidated.
Section 2121 (a) of the Tax Reform Act was introduced into the
6
Senate by Senator Paul Fannin of Arizona. 8 Senator Fannin told
the Senate that "[t] his problem is primarily confined to the States
of Arizona and New Mexico where Arizona power companies are
to a discriminatory tax imposed by the State of New Mexsubject
ico. ' ' 6 1 As the Supreme Court noted, Senator Fannin's remarks
seemed to have been directed towards the New Mexico Electrical
Energy Tax Act.7 In approving the bill, the United States Senate
Finance Committee found that only one state had placed a discriminatory tax upon the production of electricity within its boundaries
and sold for consumption outside the state.7 The Senate Commit63. It is the opinion of Justices Rehnquist and White in their concurring opinion in
Arizona Public Service Co. v. Snead that if the federal statute had been a codification of the
Commerce Clause, then an examination of the entire tax structure would have been appropriate, and the energy tax would have been held valid.
64. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 232-33 (1974).
65. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146-52 (1963).
66. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971).
67. Tax Reform Act of 1976, §2121(a), 15 U.S.C. §391 (1976).
68. 121 Cong. Rec. 19213 (1975); S. 1957, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §391 (1976)).
69. 122 Cong. Rec. 5382 (1976).
70. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 99 S.Ct. 1629, 1633 (1979).
71. S.Rep. No. 94-938, Part I, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 437, reprintedin [1976] U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 3439, 3866.
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tee was undoubtedly referring to New Mexico. 7 2 Senator Pete
Domenici of New Mexico proposed an amendment to Fannin's bill
which would have stricken the bill entirely. 7 3 During the floor
debates on the Domenici amendment, reference was made to the
effect the bill would have on the New Mexico Electrical Energy Tax
Act. 7 4 Domenici's amendment was defeated and Congress passed
Senator Fannin's bill with no further comment. 75 This activity by
the Senate indicates that Congress intended
Section 2121(a) to pre76
empt the Electrical Energy Tax Act.
The New Mexico Supreme Court failed to consider the legislative
history of Section 2121 (a) or any other factors to determine if Congress had intended to exclude the state from imposing the Electrical
Energy Tax Act. The United States Supreme Court did consider the
history, 7 7 however, and concluded that Congress expressly intended
to invalidate the Act.
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE CLAIM

The considerations in the Commerce Clause claim 7 8 put forth by
the plaintiffs were closely related to those in the preemption claim.
Both claims focus on the burdens placed on interstate commerce by
the state energy tax. The constitutional challenge of the Commerce
Clause is concerned with the prohibition against undue burdens that
discriminate against interstate commerce. The Commerce Clause
gives Congress the power "[t] o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes ....-79 A state may regulate interstate commerce but it may
72. Senator Paul Fannin sat on the Senate Finance Committee and sponsored the bill.
His purpose in sponsoring the bill is clear from the text accompanying footnote 74.
73. 122 Cong. Rec. S12712 (daily ed. July 28, 1976).
74. Id at S12712 to S12717.
75. 122 Cong. Rec. D1093 (daily ed. August 6, 1976).
76. The legislative history of Section 2121(a) is limited to comments made on the floor
of the Senate and to the brief findings of the Senate Finance Committee. Reference was
made during these sessions only to the New Mexico Electrical Energy Tax Act. This fact
raises a strong presumption that Congress, in enacting Section 2121(a), intended to preempt
the only state tax to have been considered, the New Mexico energy tax. A contention made
by appellees was that the legislative history may not have been applicable to Section 2121
(a) as the language of the section was changed by a House-Senate Conference Committee
before the bill was signed into law. The statutory test for whether a state tax would be
found discriminatory was changed from a tax that results in "payment of a higher gross or
net tax" on interstate electricity to one that results in a "greater tax burden" on interstate
electricity. The original test was intact at the time of the comments made by Senators
Fannin and Domenici and of the Senate Finance Report. However, the purpose of the bill
remained the same after the change in wording.
77. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 99 S.Ct. 1629, 1633-34 (1979).
78. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
79. Id.
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not inhibit the free flow of commerce. 8 0 In the area of state taxation, the concern is that the state tax only those activities or people
that it has the power to tax within its borders.8 ' The United States
Supreme Court did not reach a consideration of the Commerce
Clause claim because the Court found the Act to be preempted by
Section 2121 (a).
The New Mexico Supreme Court did consider the Commerce
Clause claim. The court applied two tests to determine if the Act was
constitutional under the Commerce Clause. The tests applied were
the "discrimination test" and the "multiple burden test." 8 2 The
discrimination test provides that a tax is discriminatory if it places an
extra burden only on interstate commerce or erects barriers which
place out-of-state businesses at a disadvantage when competing
locally.8 3 The multiple burden test provides that a tax is unconstitutional if it subjects interstate commerce to similar taxes by other
states resulting in multiple taxation.' ' A tax must satisfy both tests
to be found non-violative of the Commerce Clause.8 '
In applying the discrimination test, the New Mexico Supreme
Court did not consider whether the Electrical Energy Tax placed an
extra burden on interstate commerce. 8 6 The court only concluded
that the tax did not place out-of-state businesses at a disadvantage
when competing locally because the tax credit provision was available to all businesses who sold electricity in New Mexico. 8 7 This
conclusion may not have been relevant as very little local competition occurs. The out-of-state producers of electricity sell almost all of
their electricity outside of New Mexico. 8 8
Proper application of the discrimination test requires a determination of whether the tax placed an extra burden on interstate commerce beyond the burden borne by intrastate commerce. The Electrical Energy Tax applied equally to all producers whether they were
out-of-state businesses or in-state businesses. 8 9 All electricity was
taxed at the point of generation. 9 Its destination was irrelevant.
80. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945).
81. Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 95 (1948).
82. 91 N.M. 485, 489, 576 P.2d 291, 295 (1978).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 87 (1948).
86. The court did consider burdens placed on interstate commerce when it found Section
2121(a) not applicable to the New Mexico Electrical Energy Tax Act. It, however, considered "greater tax burdens" placed on interstate commerce, not "extra burdens." The
result of considering the latter are different. 91 N.M. 485, 488, 576 P.2d 291, 294 (1978).
87. Id. at 489, 576 P.2d at 295.
88. Record, vol. 5, at 954.
89. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-18-3 (1978).
90. Id.
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In-state businesses did, however, receive a tax credit for the taxes
paid at the point of generation.9 1 In effect, this credit negated their
liability for the energy tax. Out-of-state businesses did not receive
the tax credit unless they sold electricity within the state. It may be
argued, therefore, that the electricity sold outside the state bore the
entire burden of the energy tax. This would surely be an extra burden under the definition of the discrimination test used by the state
supreme court.
In applying the multiple burden test, the New Mexico Supreme
Court concluded that since it was the generation of electricity that
was being taxed and since the generation occurred only within New
Mexico, there was little chance of a multiple tax burden falling on
that same activity. 9 2 Generation of electricity was found to be a
local and separate activity by the United States Supreme Court in
Utah Power and Light Company v. Pfost.9" It is comparable to
production or manufacturing activities which have traditionally been
viewed as local in nature. 9" The determination that an activity is
separate from interstate commerce and local in nature, however, is
not sufficient grounds for a state tax to be held constitutional. The
activity must also be one that "does not lend itself to repeated
exactions in other state[s] ." ' Since the generation of electricity
occurs only once, a tax on the generation cannot be exacted at more
than one point.
If the generation of electricity is not regarded as local and therefore out of the realm of interstate commerce, 9 6 but is regarded as
part of interstate commerce, then the activity, though protected by
the Commerce Clause, may be taxed by a state if properly apportioned.9 '7 The standards established in a recent United States
Supreme Court decision, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,9 8
which allow a state to tax interstate commerce are: 1) the tax must
be fairly apportioned; 2) it must be related to state-provided services;
3) it must be nondiscriminatory of interstate commerce; and, 4) it
must be applied to an activity having a substantial nexus with the
91. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-80 (B) (1978).

92. 91 N.M. 485, 490, 576 P.2d 291, 296 (1978).
93. 286 U.S. 165, 181 (1932); See also Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co.,

303 U.S. 604 (1938).
94. American Manufacturing Co. v. City of St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919); Cornell v.
Coyne, 192 U.S. 418 (1904); United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1894).
95. Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 87 (1948).
96. It may be argued that the generation of electricity can no longer be regarded as a
local activity which is not a part of interstate commerce now that Congress' power to
proscribe taxation of it has been judicially recognized by the court in Arizona Public Service
Co. v. Snead.
97. Id. at 93.
98. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
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taxing state. 9 9 The New Mexico Supreme Court did not consider the
tests set out in Complete Auto although it is the most recent statement on state taxation of things arguably in interstate commerce.
The New Mexico Electrical Energy Tax Act placed a tax on the
activity of generation of electricity. The activity occurs only within
New Mexico, which made the tax fairly apportioned and which supplied the necessary nexus to the taxing state. The tax was related to
state-provided services because the State of New Mexico maintains
highways in the Four Corners area' 0 0 and provides community services to workers employed by the businesses. 0 1 Revenues generated
by the energy tax were specifically reserved for highway improvements in the Four Comers area. 1 0 2 Thus, the energy tax directly
related to the provision of services by the state to the energy producers. The tax met three of the four requisites found in Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady. 03 The Electrical Energy Tax did not
meet the fourth standard, which is that the tax must be nondiscriminatory of interstate commerce. This unresolved issue of discrimination against interstate commerce was sidestepped twice by the New
Mexico Supreme Court when the court did not fully examine the
preemption claim or the discrimination test under the Commerce
Clause claim. The issue was resolved by the United States Supreme
Court when it found the New Mexico Electrical Energy Tax Act to
be invalid because of its discriminatory effect on interstate commerce.
CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, found
the New Mexico Electrical Energy Tax Act to be invalid because of a
violation of the preemption doctrine. This decision was reached because the Court construed the pertinent federal statute as having
independent vitality apart from the Commerce Clause. Such a determination allowed the Court to avoid a consideration of the constitutional issues raised by the New Mexico tax. If the Court had construed the federal statute as a mere codification of the Commerce
Clause, the result may have been different. In that case, the Court
would have had to consider the constitutional issues and the validity
of the New Mexico tax may have been upheld.
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